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Thomas v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 63 (Sept. 14, 2017)1
CONSTITUTIONAL & CRIMINAL LAW: DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Summary
When a defendant requests and is granted a mistrial, jeopardy will attach if a prosecutor’s
conduct is so egregious that it results in prejudice to the defendant that cannot be remedied by
anything short of a mistrial.2
Background
Lacy L. Thomas, the former chief executive officer at University Medical Center (UMC),
was tried for five counts of theft and five counts of official misconduct related to contracts UMC
entered with five separate entities who were Thomas’s acquaintances. The State found these
contracts so grossly unfavorable to UMC, that they constituted theft. One of these contracts
involved Superior Consulting (ACS).
On approximately the fifth day of trial, an attorney for ACS informed Thomas’ attorneys
of a disc containing documents that exonerated ACS. ACS’s attorney advised that the documents
had been provided to the detectives who were investigating both ACS and Thomas. However, the
documents were never provided to Thomas. Accordingly, Thomas moved for a mistrial. The
district court found that the documents provided substantial material relevant to the crossexamination of thirteen key witnesses who had already testified and granted a mistrial.
Thomas then filed a motion to dismiss the case under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The
district court granted the motion. On appeal, the Court upheld the dismissal of the theft charges
related to ACS, but found that the indictment provided Thomas with sufficient notice of the
remaining counts of theft and official misconduct.3 On remand, Thomas renewed his motion to
dismiss based on double jeopardy. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court made a
conclusive finding that: (1) the documents at issue were exculpatory and (2) the documents had
been provided to the district attorney’s office. Nonetheless, the district court denied Thomas’s
double jeopardy motion because it found that the State had not intentionally withheld the
documents. The district court added that the documents withheld related to ACS’s conduct, and
because the theft charge was dismissed with respect to ACS, double jeopardy did not “carryover”
to the remaining counts.
Thomas petitioned the Court for extraordinary relief, asking the Court to consider whether
double jeopardy bars reprosecution and had attached to all charged counts. He also asked the Court
to consider whether the district court had authority to rule on his renewed motion to dismiss for
unconstitutional vagueness since he alleged that the district court had not reached these claims.
Discussion:
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We exercise our discretion to consider Thomas’s petition
The Court has the sole discretion to decide whether to consider a writ of mandamus.4
Judicial economy supports a review of the double jeopardy issues raised, before a second jury trial.
Therefore, the Court exercised discretion to intervene by way of extraordinary writ.
Double jeopardy applies in this case
Generally, a state may not charge a defendant twice for the same offense.5 To protect
defendants from potential abuse by the State, courts have distinguished between cases where the
prosecution requested a mistrial and those where the defense requested a mistrial.6
Double jeopardy following the State’s request for mistrial
In cases where a prosecutor requests a mistrial, there is a strong concern that the State may
seek a mistrial for its own advantage. Under these circumstances, a court must examine: (1)
whether the mistrial was imposed by “manifest necessity,” and (2) “in the presence of manifest
necessity, whether the prosecutor is responsible for the circumstances which necessitated
declaration of a mistrial.”7
Double jeopardy following a defendant’s request for mistrial
When a defendant moves for, or consents to, a mistrial generally any bar to reprosecution,
under the Double Jeopardy Clause, is removed.8 However, there is a narrow exception that enables
the defendant to raise double jeopardy as a defense to subsequent reprosecution. This exception
applies when the prosecutor intentionally provokes or “goads” the defendant into moving for a
mistrial.9 The Court had previously adopted the Kennedy standard in Melchor-Gloria v. State,
which bars reprosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause if a defendant demonstrates intent by
the State to provoke a mistrial.10
Criticism of the Kennedy standard
The inherent difficulties found in the Kennedy standard are thoroughly discussed in Pool
v. Superior Court.11 The Arizona Supreme Court noted that, under Kennedy, proving specific intent
to provoke mistrial, “must necessarily involve a subjective inquiry and is too difficult to
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determine.”12 The court held that in addition to those instances where a prosecutor intentionally
attempts to “goad” a defendant into moving for a mistrial, jeopardy would attach where double
jeopardy protections “would be impaired by a prosecutor’s intentional, improper conduct.”13
New standard for double jeopardy following a defendant’s successful motion for mistrial
The Court reviewed Pool and other state court decisions that discussed the Kennedy
standard and found that it was unduly narrow. The Court adopted the Pool standard which states
that when a defendant requests and is granted a mistrial, jeopardy will attach if the prosecutor’s
conduct is so egregious that it results in prejudice to the defendant which cannot be cured by any
means short of a mistrial. Accordingly, courts should consider the following factors when
evaluating a double jeopardy claim following a defendant's motion for a mistrial:
1. mistrial is granted because of improper conduct or actions
by the prosecutor; and
2. such conduct is not merely the result of legal error,
negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a
whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows
to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any
improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger
of mistrial . . . ; and
3. the conduct causes prejudice to the defendant which
cannot be cured by means short of a mistria1.14
Concerning the second prong of this test, the Court noted that the question of whether a
prosecutor “knows” or “intends” his conduct to be improper and prejudicial should be measured
by objective factors such as:
the situation in which the prosecutor found himself, the evidence of
actual knowledge and intent and any other factors which may give
rise to an appropriate inference or conclusion. [A trial court] may
also consider the prosecutor's own explanations of his “knowledge”
and “intent” to the extent that such explanation can be given
credence in light of the minimum requirements expected of all
lawyers.15
The Court reiterated that the misconduct at issue must amount to more than “insignificant
impropriety.”
Concerning the third prong of this test, the Court noted that the district court has many
ways in which to remedy prosecutorial misconduct. Thus, double jeopardy will attach only when
misconduct by the prosecutor is egregious and intentional, which necessitates the grant of a
mistria1.
Under the facts of this case, double jeopardy bars reprosecution
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At the evidentiary hearing regarding the double jeopardy motion, ACS’s counsel testified
that he had provided police officers investigating the case with a disc of documents that he believed
demonstrated that ACS had met its contractual obligations. Detective Robert Whitely remembered
receiving the disc, and stated that, based on this evidence, he and Sergeant Michael Ford had
recommended that the district attorney not charge ACS. Prior to the grand jury proceedings,
Sergeant Ford remembered speaking with Deputy District Attorney Scott Mitchell on at least one
occasion where this evidence had been brought up. After reviewing this testimony, the district
court concluded that the prosecution did not intentionally act to withhold the evidence.
The Court disagreed and concluded that this finding was clearly erroneous. The Court
found that police officers’ testimony, coupled with the State’s failure to present any evidentiary
testimony in defense against Thomas’s motion, was sufficient to determine that double jeopardy
bars reprosecution.
Under the Court’s newly-adopted three-part test, the record reflected that the mistrial was
granted due to Mitchell’s improper conduct. The district court properly concluded that a mistrial
was the only remedy that would cure the prejudice to Thomas. This conclusion was based on the
facts that: (1) the mistrial motion was not fully litigated until the tenth day of trial; (2) the
exculpatory nature and volume of documents disclosed; and (3) the number of witnesses that had
already testified. The Court found that the intentional withholding of these documents was not a
minor error. Rather, the misconduct satisfied the standard set forth in Pool, and therefore double
jeopardy barred his reprosecution.
Double jeopardy bars reprosecution on all charged counts
When the jury is sworn, double jeopardy attaches.16 As established by the United States
Supreme Court, the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause arise from the fact that: (1) multiple
prosecutions seriously disrupt a defendant’s personal life; (2) it can create the potential for
governmental harassment of the defendant; and (3) it enhances the likelihood that an innocent
defendant may be convicted.17 The interests protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause strongly
suggest that when a case ends in mistrial, double jeopardy will bar reprosecution either on all
counts or no counts. Because the Court concluded that double jeopardy attached to all counts when
the jury was sworn, it bars reprosecution of Thomas on all counts.
Conclusion
Evidence suggests that the prosecutor intentionally and improperly withheld exculpatory
documents from Thomas. The prosecutor’s conduct was not an insignificant error. Rather, his
conduct was egregious and improper, causing prejudice to Thomas that could only be cured by
declaring a mistrial. Therefore, under the standard set forth in Pool, double jeopardy bars
reprosecution of Thomas. Since double jeopardy attached to all counts when the jury was sworn,
reprosecution of Thomas is barred on all counts.
GIBBONS, J., concurring:
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Justice Gibbons concurred only with the majority’s result.
PICKERING, J., dissenting:
Justice Pickering disagreed with the majority’s determination that the district court’s
findings were “clearly erroneous” in regards to whether the State intentionally suppressed the
exculpatory documents. Justice Pickering disagreed with the majority’s assertion that its decision
did not overrule Melchor-Gloria. If the court had applied the standard set in Pool, to MelchorGloria, a different analysis would have been required resulting in the defendant going free. This
suggests that the new standard in Pool/Thomas overrules the goaded-mistrial test that MelchorGloria adopted from Kennedy. Justice Pickering concluded that the majority should have
remanded the case so that the parties could litigate and the district court could decide whether a
retrial would violate double jeopardy.
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